Foreign currency indebtedness: a potential systemic risk in emerging Europe.  ECRI Commentary No. 8, 5 December 2011 by Fiorante, Angelo.
1 | FOREIGN CURRENCY INDEBTEDNESS: A POTENTIAL SYSTEMIC RISK IN EMERGING EUROPE   
 
 
ECRI Commentaries provide short analyses of ongoing developments with regard to credit markets in 
Europe. ECRI researchers as well as external experts contribute to the series. External experts are 
invited to suggest topics of interest for ECRI Commentaries.  
 
Angelo Fiorante is Research Assistant at the European Credit Research Institute within CEPS in 
Brussels. Comments by Karel Lannoo, CEO of CEPS and Director of ECRI, Elina Pyykkö, Researcher at 
CEPS/ECRI, and Willem Pieter De Groen, Research Assistant at CEPS, are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Available for free downloading from the ECRI website (http://www.ecri.eu) © ECRI 2011 
 
 
 
 
Foreign currency indebtedness:  
A potential systemic risk in emerging Europe 
Angelo Fiorante 
ECRI Commentary No. 8, 5 December 2011  
 
Foreign currency indebtedness in new EU member states has had serious post-crisis 
consequences, where a substantial currency mismatch has contributed to an alteration in the 
macroeconomic and financial risk profile of individual countries. Although a first set of 
recommendations has been proposed by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a pivotal 
challenge ahead for emerging Europe will be to strengthen institutional and monetary 
credibility, and reinforce stable and efficient capital markets that are less dependent on foreign 
capital inflows. This would ultimately reduce countries’ vulnerability to future shocks to the 
economy, and facilitate their full-blown recovery.  
 
evels of foreign currency (FX) indebtedness are endangering financial stability and 
increasing the risk of systemic crisis in new EU member states. Although recovery from 
the global crisis in emerging Europe has been surprisingly sound up to now, the lack of a 
resolution of the eurozone’s debt problems is dragging the region into a negative spiral and 
stalling its full-blown recovery. The EBRD has recently downgraded Central and East European 
growth forecasts amid worries over eurozone exposure (EBRD, 2011). Capital flows are 
reversing as investors seek safer assets, and the region’s financial sector, which is characterised 
by a high number of eurozone banks that operate with subsidiaries, fears a possible credit 
crunch if the liquidity from parent banks dries up.  
Initiatives to curb FX lending have been taken in the past throughout the region, however, with 
varying outcomes. The debate recently escalated when Hungary passed a new law in 
September 2011 without properly consulting the European Central Bank (CON/2011/87). The 
new law allows households with foreign currency loans to pre-pay them at a discounted 
exchange rate (180 HUF/CHF for Swiss francs, 250 HUF/EUR for euro and 200 HUF/100 JPY 
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for yen). The debt restructuring programme is said to provide significant temporary relief for 
distressed households, but the temporary losses will have to be borne by the banking sector, 
which consists mostly of subsidiaries of eurozone banks that are already under pressure. Policy-
makers and experts are asking themselves how the de-dollarisation1 strategies in emerging 
E u r o p e  s h o u l d  b e  s h a p e d  t o  a v o i d  s e v e r e  d r a w b a c k s ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  i n  t h e m s e l v e s  p r o v e  
counterproductive in the near future.  
As calls for policy action intensify, the first coordinated effort for curbing FX lending in Europe 
has been put forward recently by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB/2011/1). The policy 
recommendations are said to increase the resilience of the financial system by addressing 
manifold risks stemming from excessive foreign currency lending. Both Austria’s central bank 
and Sweden’s Riksbanken welcomed the ESRB’s initiatives in an open statement, acknowledging 
further how their banking sectors have been, and still are to some degree, affected by cross-
border spillovers from badly originated FX loans in emerging EU member states.  
 
FX lending sky-rockets...  
The global crisis is clearly shedding light on several risk aspects that our financial systems 
created and incubated during the boom period. A risk that has become highly visible in the 
aftermath is the currency risk exposure that the private sector (households in particular) in 
emerging Europe is facing as a consequence of the lavish unhedged foreign currency borrowing 
trend, which gained momentum when Eastern Europe undertook the convergence process of 
Western Europe.  
Household credit growth in EMU aspirant countries was in full swing prior to the crisis (see 
Figure 1). EU-related reforms, combined with market liberalisation measures jump-started a 
convergence process, making countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania experience economic growth at a fast pace, and the adoption of the euro 
appeared to be just around the corner. At the same time, when credit demand was high, foreign 
currency borrowing became popular and much of the credit was actually funded by financial 
institutions from a Western Europe that spotted lucrative business opportunities. What 
appeared to be a win-win situation for financial institutions facing a rather mature market in the 
West, and the emerging private sector that could suddenly access to cheaper credit, turned into 
a currency mismatch problem. 
The credit boom in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) took off in 2004, and was 
above all driven by foreign currency lending from Nordic banks. A significant portion of FX 
loans relative to the size of their economies is observed, and the ratio has increased distinctly in  
                                                            
1 The terminology “dollarisation” denotes the usage of foreign currency loans in general, and does not explicitly mean the usage of 
dollar denominated loans. Liabilities of the household sector in emerging Europe have predominantly been denominated in euro or 
in Swiss Francs, but other currencies have also been used, such as the dollar or the yen.   3 | FOREIGN CURRENCY INDEBTEDNESS: A POTENTIAL SYSTEMIC RISK IN EMERGING EUROPE   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Real average credit growth of households 
 
Source: Lending to Households in Europe (1995-2010): ECRI Statistical Package 2011, CEPS, Brussels, August 2011. Henceforth this 
citation is referred to as the “‘ECRI Statistical Package 2011”.2 
past years (see Figure 2). Ever since their independence there has been a clear commitment to 
adopting the euro. However, Estonia is the only country that reduced its currency risk exposure 
when it officially adopted the euro in January 2011. For Latvia and Lithuania, fiscal adjustments 
have been put in place that might enable them to adopt the euro in 2014; however, in the 
meantime they will have to monitor their currency risk exposure closely, which could 
ultimately threaten financial stability.  
As with the Baltic countries, the rapid credit expansion in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania) gained momentum in 2004, underpinned by foreign currency 
borrowing. It is particularly interesting to note that loans denominated in foreign currency 
account for a substantial part of total loans (see Figure 3). The composition of the loan portfolios 
shows that a clear shift towards FX loans took place between 2005 and 2010. Some countries 
have had a high percentage of FX loans to start with, others, such as Hungary, Romania and  
 
           Figure 2. FX loans, % of GDP         Figure 3. Foreign currency loans, % of total 
             
Source: ECRI Statistical Package 2011. 
                                                            
2 For further information, visit the website: www.ecri.eu or contact Angelo.Fiorante@ceps.eu. 
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Bulgaria, have increased their shares quite dramatically in recent years. In fact, the currency 
breakdown of outstanding household loans, where the stock of local currency loans grew with 
less momentum than the stock of FX loans, denotes a clear shift of preference. The sectoral 
composition of household credit shows that in the Baltic countries FX loans were mainly 
designated to house purchases, whereas in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania a considerable 
share was granted for consumption purposes (see annex). This further highlights how currency 
risk is clearly underestimated and draws attention to the core of the problem.   
 
...and the crisis has not slowed the upward trend 
Surprisingly, the impact of the financial crisis has not discouraged the FX lending trend. The 
aggregated amount of foreign currency loans extended to households represented roughly €100 
billion in 2010 for the selected countries (see Figure 4). Although a slowdown is apparent, it is 
more likely to reflect the general lending downturn. Foreign banks operating in the region 
might have started to acknowledge their risk exposure and tightened the lending standards for 
FX loans and credit in general, slowing down lending, but still there is no sign that households 
are shifting their preferences towards local currency loans (Beckmann et al., 2011). In fact, year-
on-year credit growth of FX loans has in most cases consistently exceeded the growth rate of 
local currency loans (see annex). This indicates that the problem persists and will not go away 
by itself.  
 
    Figure  4. FX loan growth by country                   Figure  5. Real GDP growth 
 
           
 
Source (Figure 4): ECRI Statistical Package 2011. 
Source (Figure 5): Eurostat.  Note: Fixed exchange rate: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Floating exchange rate: Hungary, Poland, 
Romania (EBRD). 
The currency mismatch has added a new risk dimension that concerns financial stability in 
emerging Europe, and the risk is in fact materialising and compounding the crisis by holding 
back its recovery. Countries with a floating exchange rate (e.g. Hungary, Romania and Poland) 
suffered a depreciation that made FX loans unaffordable to households with small margins, and 
countries with a fixed exchange rate (e.g. Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria) needed to 
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restructure their economies while maintaining their currency pegs, which complicated the 
policy actions needed to respond to the crisis. The countries with a currency board arrangement 
(i.e. the exchange rate between the domestic and a selected foreign currency is fixed) witnessed 
the sharpest fall in real GDP growth (see Figure 5).   
Although the first act of the crisis (2008-10) has been managed and controlled with the help of 
fiscal reforms and in some cases with external support, the second act, the eurozone crisis 
(2011-), is playing out right now in emerging Europe’s ‘backyard’ and might be a tougher 
challenge to muddle through. Apart from Poland, which is by far the largest economy of the 
new EU members, worries are growing about how the euro crisis could severely affect the 
smaller economies. 
 
Motives for taking out FX loans and the risk involved 
The current literature offers numerous explanations to the soaring growth in foreign currency 
loans, where both supply-side and demand-side drivers have been highlighted. Some plausible 
factors that are said to have encouraged an excessive debt accumulation in foreign currency are, 
for example, different types of market liberalisation measures, the presence of foreign-owned 
banks, the accessibility of cheap and abundant credit in the pre-crisis period due to large capital 
inflows, the stability and credibility of macroeconomic policy, and the effect of exchange rate 
regimes (e.g. Paulhart et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2009; Arteta, 2005; Coudert & Pouvelle, 2008).   
However, a more simplistic and perhaps the most straightforward explanation has been 
attributed to the interest rate spread between loans in local currency and loans in foreign 
currency (e.g. Steiner, 2011; Csajbók et al., 2010; Rosenberg & Tirpák, 2008; Basso et al., 2007). 
Borrowing in a low-yielding currency to fund investment in a high-yielding currency is a 
financial transaction known as “carry trade”. The risk involved in such a contract is 
straightforward, since households usually lack a natural currency hedge (i.e. cash or other 
assets used to pay loan instalments are not in foreign currency) and the means to purchase 
derivatives to manage FX risk are small, making them subject to exchange rate volatility. 
However, considering the popularity of these types of contracts one might think that 
households neglect, are not sufficiently informed or even accept the risks involved in foreign 
currency borrowing. Moreover, having made extensive use of FX loans for house purchases (see 
annex) means that households are doubly exposed when accounting for unfavourable house 
price developments, which is of relevance as asset bubbles are usually the bi-product of 
exponential credit growth.  
EU officials and national regulators reckon that the ‘dollarisation’ – or rather the ‘euro-isation’ – 
process has serious inherent threats for the financial stability of many emerging European 
countries. The fast-paced credit growth recorded in the pre-crisis period is said to contain short-
term borrowing trends that led to the build-up of a systematic currency mismatch in household 
budgets. While it did not appear problematic back then, today many households in countries 6 | ANGELO FIORANTE 
 
with floating exchange rates have been subject to substantial exchange rate volatility, and those 
countries with a fixed currency regime experienced severe austerity measures. In both cases, the 
debt servicing costs of loans have been aggravated and this has in turn exacerbated borrowers’ 
default risk.   
The peril of borrowing in foreign currency affects not only borrowers but also lenders. In fact, a 
high percentage of non-performing loans (NPLs) seems to go hand in hand with the 
pronounced pre-crisis credit growth in the region (see Figure 6). The banking sector has now a 
major challenge ahead: that of absorbing or restructuring ‘bad loans’. Parent banks, many of 
them from the eurozone, are urged to recapitalise their subsidiaries and branches to reignite 
growth and avoid a credit crunch in the region. However, the political will to do so may have 
been diminished by the current ambiguity over the eurozone’s own debt problems and weak 
financial situation, especially if losses from a potential ‘hair-cut’ of Greek bonds materialise.  
 
          Figure  6. NPLs & credit boom 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on credit growth data from ECRI Statistical Package 2011 and non-performing loans data 
from IMF International Financial Statistics.  
 
Paving the way for EU-wide FX lending supervision  
The first recommendations coming from Europe’s new top watchdog, the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), whose mission is to flag systemic risks affecting the EU’s financial stability, 
offer a range of risk-mitigating solutions to abate foreign currency mismatches. Considering 
that it tackles the problem in a more coordinated fashion than previous policy measures 
adopted at national level, which in fact had a rather limited impact on discouraging foreign 
currency lending (ECB, 2010), the recommendations can be seen as a step in the right direction.  
According to the ESRB, the recommendations include i) that adequate information on the risks 
associated with foreign currency loans is efficiently conveyed to borrowers; ii) the 
creditworthiness of new borrowers is improved by setting more stringent underwriting 
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standards, such as applying higher debt service-to-income and loan-to-value ratios; iii) foreign 
currency lending is monitored and curtailed when it becomes a significant contributing factor to 
excessive overall credit growth. It further suggests that iv) financial institutions incorporate FX 
risk into their internal risk management system, and v) consequently hold adequate capital that 
is in line with their exposure. Lastly, vi) it urges national supervisory authorities to monitor and 
control funding and liquidity risk taken by financial institutions, especially where currency and 
maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities are being built up; when reliance on foreign 
markets for currency swaps is great; and when there is a concentration of funding sources.     
The high level of foreign currency indebtedness in emerging Europe has EU-wide ramifications. 
Hopefully, the action taken by the ESRB will put foreign currency lending practices on a 
sounder footing. However, policy-makers need to realise that over-regulating the market for FX 
loans might be dangerous, and indeed counterproductive, when financial stability is still a 
problem and local currency funding is undeveloped. This might apply to member states that are 
less integrated into ‘core Europe’ (Zettelmeyer et al., 2010). Since there appears to be no quick-
fix or one-size-fit-all solution to the problem, a selective implementation of the 
recommendations based on a county-by-country basis is crucial if we are to avoid knocking 
back overall credit growth to a perilous level and derail emerging Europe’s road to recovery. 
The effect of these recommendations is still to be seen. National supervisory authorities have 
until December 2013 to follow through and implement the various recommendations where the 
ESRB is set to monitor the progress by applying the ‘comply or explain’ principle. Stay tuned.  
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Annex - Stylised facts3 
Bulgaria 
Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
 
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)           FX lending development, % of total  
 
 
Estonia 
             Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
 
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)           FX lending development, % of total                    
  
                                                            
3 Source: ECRI Statistical Package 2011. 
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Hungary 
             Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
  
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)           FX lending development, % of total                    
  
 
Latvia 
             Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
      
 
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)            FX lending development, % of total                    
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Lithuania 
             Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
     
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)            FX lending development, % of total                    
  
 
Poland 
             Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
      
 
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)             FX lending development, % of total                    
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Romania 
             Total credit to households (stock)                                  Year-on-year credit growth (in %) 
       
 
Household credit by type and currency (end 2010)             FX lending development, % of total                    
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